From Foreign Policy, Fred Bergsten laments China’s refusal to follow Japan down the currency appreciation sink hole.
At Dissident Voice, Robert Zuniker attacks supply-side economics without mentioning stable money.
...There is evidence that austerity did lead to growth in the past, and that it did not cause fascism. These examples may be less known, but they suggest that austerity can bring recovery faster than spending can.Brian Domitrovic has written how there was virtual consensus between Presidents Wilson's and Harding's money men on reducing top marginal rates before the election, so how could Shlaes forget Mellon’s tax cutting agenda that kicked off the Roaring Twenties? The Revenue Act of 1921 brought the top marginal tax rate down to 58% in 1922 from 73%, and with subsequent reductions, Mellon was able to get that top tax rate down to 25% by 1925. The austerity of the 1920s did not take place without efforts to foster economic growth. In this, Shlaes was sloppy.
A strong example in U.S. history is the recession of the early 1920s. Responding to a downturn, the federal government didn't spend; it cut itself in half. Recovery followed so rapidly few people even remember that recession.
In The WSJ, Newt Gingrich and Peter Ferrara advocate making the Bush tax rates permanent.Viewed more broadly, the carnage on Wall Street in September 2008 was the inevitable crash of a 40-year financial bubble spawned by the Fed after Nixon closed the gold window in August 1971. As time passed, the Fed's market-rigging and money-printing actions had become increasingly destructive — leaving the banking system ever more unstable and populated with a growing bevy of Too Big to Fail institutions.
The 1984 rescue of Continental Illinois; the 1994 Mexican peso crisis bailouts; the Fed's 1998 life-support operation for LTCM — were all just steps along the way to the fall of 2008.
Then, faced with the collapse of their own handiwork, Washington panicked and joined the Fed in unleashing an indiscriminate bailout capitalism that has now thoroughly corrupted the halls of government, even as it has become a debilitating blight on the free market.
When the Fed prints money, investors flee to other currencies, and foreign central banks intervene and buy dollars which they invest in Treasuries. It has precisely the same effect as the Fed’s own buying of bonds — yields fall. This increases the risk of future inflation so the market buys hedges against it (and you should, too).
The WSJ editorial board warns Democrats and Republicans against scapegoating China.
On CNBC, Paul Krugman calls China “the bad guy” in the currency war, and advocates for trillions in additional quantitative easing:
Reuters reports increased unemployment and inflation.
At Conscience of a Liberal, Krugman makes a convincing argument that the scariest part of debt-to-GDP analysis is the weak GDP:
At Forbes, Rich Karlgaard applauds Greg Mankiw’s recent tax analysis.
On The Kudlow Report, Stephen Moore analyzes the President’s NYT contrition:
Seeker Blog discusses Douglas Irwin’s recent paper, “Did France Cause the Great Depression?”
From 1997, Jude Wanniski argues the Great Depression was solely a fiscal crisis.
From June, John Tamny suggests there was a deflationary component in the 1920s.
Sure, consumer spending accounts for approximately 70 percent of America's gross domestic product, and increases in consumer spending would provide the economy with an immediate boost. But a drop in consumer spending is not what ails the economy. In fact, as a percentage of GDP, consumer spending actually increased during the downturn, the Commerce Department's Bureau of Economic Analysis reports - from approximately 69.2 percent of GDP in the fourth quarter (October-December) of 2007 to approximately 71 percent of GDP in the April-June quarter of 2009.
So the conventional wisdom - that a sharp decline in consumer spending caused the economy's downturn - is wrong.
What did cause the downturn? The answer is: a sharp decline in private investment.
Smith constructed his masterpiece on a few ingenious insights into the workings of a commercial economy. Where his contemporaries calculated national wealth in terms of gold or agricultural output, Smith measured "opulence" by the flow of consumable goods. The division of labor would accelerate the production of goods, he argued, and render manufacture ever more efficient. The division of labor itself was best determined by markets of self-interested individuals. Markets, in turn, operated best when freed of regulation and interference, thus allowing the value and price of both commodities and labor to align themselves.